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CHINA’S PRACTICE OF PROCURING ORGANS
FROM EXECUTED PRISONERS:
HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS MUST NARROWLY TAILOR
THEIR CRITICISM AND ENDORSE THE CHINESE
CONSTITUTION TO END ABUSES
Joan E. Hemphill†
Abstract: For the past two decades, human rights groups, medical organizations,
and the international media have excoriated China for procuring transplant organs from
executed prisoners. This practice was first authorized under China’s 1984 “Temporary
Rules Concerning the Utilization of Corpses or Organs from the Corpses of Executed
Criminals” and it is widely used by the Chinese government. Reports from Chinese
doctors and media sources reveal significant deficiencies both in the text and application
of China’s current organ-procurement laws. The lack of clear legal parameters and the
absence of enforcement measures have opened the door to problems of interpretation and
misapplication, resulting in the physical abuse of prisoners. This situation is further
exacerbated by China’s proclivity to sell prisoner organs to foreign buyers on the black
market. For these reasons, advocacy groups view China’s procurement of prisoner
organs as an infringement of prisoner rights, and they promote its abolition.
In response to international concern over China’s participation in the organ trade,
the Chinese government recently enacted the 2006 “Provisions on the Administration of
Entry and Exit of Cadavers and Treatment of Cadavers,” which prohibit organs from
exiting Chinese territory without government authorization. Although it is premature to
fully assess the efficacy of this law, the 2006 Provisions fail to modify the 1984 Order,
leaving its most significant shortcomings intact. The 2006 Provisions do not regulate
organ procurement from prisoner cadavers, nor do they address how organ-removal
procedures are conducted or applied. China’s present organ-procurement scheme is,
consequently, inadequate to protect prisoners from abuse. Human rights groups continue
to press for reforms in China’s organ-procurement practice, but current lobbying efforts
are ineffective because they lack compelling legal and political force in the Chinese
system. Human rights groups must provide stronger legal support, and narrow the focus
of reform efforts to make a more persuasive argument for the elimination of prisoner
abuse. China’s constitution provides a viable legal foundation for reform arguments
because it requires the Chinese government to preserve and protect human rights. It is
binding on all national laws, and it can be implemented to end prisoner abuse by
requiring organ-procurement laws to conform to its proscriptions. Instead of pressuring
China to enact sweeping legislation and adopt international ethical standards, reform
efforts must endorse the application of Chinese constitutional human rights requirements
to improve the treatment of prisoners in the organ-procurement practice.

† The author attends the University of Washington and plans to receive her J.D. degree in 2008.
She would like to thank Professors Dongsheng Zang and Joel Ngugi as well as the Pacific Rim Law and
Policy Journal editorial staff, who were instrumental in the development of this comment. Any errors or
omissions in this comment are the author’s own.
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INTRODUCTION

In 2001, Chinese surgeon Dr. Wang Guoqi testified before the United
States Congress that he performed more than 100 operations to remove skin
and corneas from executed prisoners.1 Although the practice of procuring
organs from prisoner cadavers is legal in China, Dr. Guoqi described ways in
which prisoners were abused during the process.2 He emphasized one
particular incident in 1995 that has “tortured [his] conscience to no end.”3
The incident occurred in the Hebei Province, where Dr. Guoqi and a team of
doctors were called to extract skin and kidneys from a prisoner’s body.4
During the execution, the guard misfired his gun, shooting the prisoner
several inches short of the target, and leaving him convulsing on the
ground.5 Although the prisoner was still alive, the supervising official
ordered the doctors to proceed with organ removal in a nearby ambulance.6
The prisoner continued to breathe even after both of his kidneys were
extracted.7 While officials rushed the kidneys to medical units, Dr. Guoqi
and his colleagues began to remove the skin from the prisoner’s half-dead
body.8 Hearing noises outside and fearing an attack from the prisoner’s
family, the doctors forced the mangled prisoner into a plastic bag, and left
him to die.9 Haunted by this and other memories of prisoner abuse, Dr.
Guoqi ultimately refused to participate in the organ-procurement practice.10
He was subsequently forced to submit a pledge not to expose his work, nor
1
Organs for Sale: China’s Growing Trade and Ultimate Violation of Prisoners’ Rights: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Intl. Operations and Human Rights of the H.R. Comm. on Intl. Relations, 107th
Cong., 57-58 (2001) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Dr. Wang Guoqi, discussing his experience in
China’s organ-procurement practice at the Tianjin General Brigade Hospital in Tianjin, China); contra
China Fury at Organ Snatching ‘Lies,’ BBC NEWS, June 28, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asiapacific/1411389.stm (rebuking Dr. Guoqi’s testimony as lies and fabrications, without denying Chinese
government used organs from executed prisoners).
2
Guanyu Liyong Sixing Zuifan Shiti Huo Shiti Qiguan de Zanxing Guiding, in Zhonghua Renmin
Gongheguo Falu Guifanxing Jieshi Jicheng [Temporary Rules Concerning the Utilization of Corpses or
Organs from the Corpses of Executed Criminals] [hereinafter 1984 Order] (authorizing the use of organs
from executed prisoners for transplant and research purposes), see Hearings, supra note 1, at 50-53, 57-59
(providing both a Chinese and an English version of China’s 1984 Order, and discussing how prisoners are
abused during organ-procurement procedures); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA, Country Report 1994: Organ
Procurement and Judicial Execution in China, August 1994, available at http://www.hrw.org/
reports/1994/china1/china_948.htm#N_100A (providing an English translation of China’s 1984 Order).
3
Hearings, supra note 1, at 58-59.
4
Id. at 58.
5
Id.
6
Id. at 58-59.
7
Id. at 59.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
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to reveal that organs are sold for profit by the Chinese government.11 When
Dr. Guoqi left China in 2000, the Chinese government was still procuring
organs from prisoner corpses at execution sites.12
Evidence of physical abuse, such as that witnessed by Dr. Guoqi,13 has
prompted international criticism of China’s practice of procuring organs
from executed criminals.14 Critics of China’s organ-procurement practice
assert that it compromises the legitimate administration of China’s penal
process, and results in brutal forms of prisoner abuse.15 Human rights
groups press China to reform both the organ-procurement and death-penalty
practices, but these efforts unnecessarily expand the scope of the issue
beyond the elimination of prisoner abuse, and misguidedly promote China’s
adoption of international standards on human rights.16 For this reason, a

11

Id.
Id.
13
Id.
14
See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 1, at 63 (testifying before the U.S. Congress, Doctor Thomas Diflo,
a New York-based surgeon, said “there are numerous eyewitness accounts of continued movement and
heart activity in some of the prisoner/donors, indicating that these people have been subject to the removal
of their organs while they are, strictly speaking, still alive.” Dr. Diflo condemns the practice of procuring
and selling Chinese prisoners’ organs, stating “this [practice] obviously represents a significant breach of
medical ethics for these doctors in that the primary tenet of our profession, to do no harm, is violated on a
continuous and ongoing basis”); Republic of China: The Olympics Countdown—Failing to Keep Human
Rights Promises, AMNESTY INT’L, Sept. 21, 2006, http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/
ENGASA170462006 [hereinafter Olympics Countdown] (asserting that obtaining actual consent in a penal
context is impossible due to the “trauma” and “anguish” of execution); The World Medical Association
Council Resolution on Organ Donation in China [hereinafter WMA Resolution], adopted at the 173rd
World Medical Association Council Session, Divonne-les-Bains, France, May 2005, available at
http://www.wma.net/e/policy/cr_5.htm (condemning organ procurement when consent is not given by
executed prisoners, and when there is no opportunity to refuse the procedure); HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH/ASIA, supra note 2 (arguing that organ procurement should be abolished because of the difficulty
of obtaining actual consent in a criminal justice context).
15
See Hearings, supra note 1, at 57, 67 (detailing instances of prisoner abuse); Geoffrey Crothall,
Executions ‘Main Source of Organs’ for Transplant Programme, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 29 1994,
at 1, available at 1994 WLNR 2313630 (outlining forms of prisoner abuse that occur during organ
procurement). See also Duncan Hewitt, Shanghai Balks at Organ Donation, BBC NEWS, Nov. 20, 2000,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/1032537.stm (suggesting that a primary fault in China’s
organ-procurement law is the lack of penal measures for the commercial use of organs).
16
Examples of human rights criticisms based on international standards include: Amnesty
International’s position that the profit motive behind organ-procurement will sustain and possibly increase
the Chinese government’s application of the death penalty, see Olympics Countdown, supra note 14
(criticizing China’s organ-procurement practice for failing to conform to international standards on
informed consent); Hearings, supra note 1, at 9-10, 12 (calling for an end to China’s practice of procuring
organs from executed prisoners, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Michael E. Parmly cites China’s poor
human rights record, lack of transparency, and deficient enforcement of existing organ-procurement laws);
Julie Lerat, Business Macabre: La Vente d’Organes de Prisonniers Exécutés, ENSEMBLE CONTRE LA PEINE
DE MORT, Jan. 2, 2007, available at http://www.abolition.fr/ecpm/french/article.php?art=434&suj=142
(criticizing China’s involvement in the organ trade, and asserting that this practice creates an obstacle for
abolishing the death penalty).
12
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new approach is needed to lend legal support to lobbying efforts, and to
present the Chinese government with a more convincing case for reform.
Part II of this Comment outlines China’s practice of procuring organs
from prisoner cadavers, explaining the Chinese government’s strong
economic incentive to use prisoner organs for commercial purposes, and
detailing human rights groups’ criticisms of this practice. Part III asserts that
human rights groups’ current approach to reforming China’s organprocurement practice is ineffective because it relies on international
standards and advocates for broad reforms. Part IV analyzes the legal
framework behind China’s organ-procurement practice, comparing the
recent 2006 Provisions on the transportation of cadavers to China’s 1984
Order on the utilization of prisoner corpses, and demonstrating how these
laws fail to square with Chinese constitutional principles on human rights.
Part V argues that the Chinese constitution must be fully implemented to
modify and reform China’s organ-procurement laws. Part VI recommends
human rights groups target their criticisms at ending the most serious
instances of prisoner abuse, and endorsing the application of Chinese
constitutional human rights requirements to lobby more effectively for
reforms. Part VII concludes this comment.
II.

HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS ASSERT CHINA’S USE OF PRISONER ORGANS
RESULTS IN ABUSE BECAUSE IT IS DRIVEN BY ECONOMIC INTERESTS
AND AUTHORIZED BY DEFICIENT LAWS

In many parts of the world, there is a wide disparity between the
demand and the supply of available transplant organs.17 Confronted with
long waiting lists, and the close prospect of death, patients from around the
globe are traveling to China to obtain transplant organs for a price.18 The
Chinese government’s harsh penal system and legalized practice of
procuring organs from prisoner cadavers yields a large supply of human
17
D.J. Rothman et al., Bellagio Task Force Report on Transplantation, Bodily Integrity, and the
International Traffic in Organs, 29 TRANSPLANTATION PROCEEDINGS 2739-45 (1997) http://www.icrc.org/
Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JNYK; David McNeill & Clifford Coonan, Japanese Flock to China for
Organ Transplants, ASIA TIMES, Apr. 4, 2006, available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/
HD04Ad01.html; Hearings, supra note 1, at 63 (reporting that there are not enough organs to meet the
demand for transplant surgeries in the United States).
18
McNeill & Coonan, supra note 17 (discussing how patients from Japan, Malaysia, Canada, and
the U.S. receive organ transplants in China); U.S. Patients Line Up for Inmates’ Organs, FINANCIAL TIMES
(Eng.), Nov. 12, 2001, available at 2001 WLNR 6259236 (describing how patients from the U.S., Japan,
and Southeast Asia are purchasing prisoner organs in China); Vanessa Hua, Patients Seeking Transplants
Turn to China: Rights Activists Fear Organs Are Taken from Executed Prisoners, S. F. CHRON., Apr. 17,
2006, available at 2006 WLNR 6395567; Ros Davidson, Death Row Black Market for Organs, SUNDAY
HERALD (Eng.), Nov. 25 2001, available at 2001 WLNR 3856091.
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transplant organs.19 Consequently, the Chinese government has developed a
highly lucrative, yet clandestine market for the sale of prisoner organs.20
Foreigners are often willing to pay tens of thousands of dollars to receive
organ transplants in China that would take years to obtain in their home
countries, and many of these patients are undeterred by the knowledge that
transplant organs are culled from prisoner corpses.21 In response to China’s
commercial use of prisoner organs, and mounting evidence of prisoner
abuse, human rights groups worry that China’s organ-procurement practice
leads to the mistreatment of prisoners.22
A.

The High Global Demand for Transplant Organs Presents China with
a Strong Economic Incentive to Sell Prisoner Body Parts

Internationally, the demand for transplant organs greatly exceeds the
supply, creating a shortage of organs in many parts of the world.23 In China,
19
1984 Order, supra note 2 (legalizing the use of prisoner organs for transplant and research
purposes); Tim Johnson, China’s Organ Supply Questioned as Transplants Soar, SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEWS, Apr. 13, 2006, at A1, available at 2006 WLNR 6213327 (discussing China’s “seemingly endless”
supply of organs due to the Chinese government’s prolific use of the death penalty). See also Stanley
Oziewicz, Shady World of Transplant Tourism in China Exposed, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 5, 2001,
at 14, available at 2001 WLNR 3736410 (reporting that a Canadian business targets China because it
considers it to be the largest available source of human transplant organs).
20
See Davidson, supra note 18 (reporting that China’s underground sales of prisoner organs create a
highly lucrative business); Jane Macartney, China to ‘Tidy Up’ Trade in Executed Prisoners’ Organs,
TIMES ONLINE (Eng.), Dec. 3, 2005, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,25689-1901558,00.html
(discussing the “big business” of organ transplant surgery in China); Vivian Wu, Removing Stigma From a
Noble Cause, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 1, 2006, at 6, available at 2006 WLNR 5420456 (reporting
that a large industry has grown around the practice of selling Chinese prisoners’ organs to foreign buyers,
and that Chinese hospitals have endeavored to keep the source of transplant organs secret); Sonya
Bryskine, Organ Trade Booming in China, EPOCH TIMES (P.R.C.), Mar. 15, 2006,
http://www.theepochtimes.com/news/6-3-15/39332.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2007) (discussing China’s
“flourishing organ trade,” and the secret nature of China’s organ-procurement practice).
21
See Erik Baard & Rebecca Cooney, The People’s Republic Has Long Been Suspected of Selling
Organs from Prisoners: Now One New York Doctor Knows the Rumors are True, VILLAGE VOICE, May 28, 2001, available at http://www.villagevoice.com/news/0118,baard,24344,1.html; Desperate
Singaporeans Seek Kidney Transplants in China, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Dec. 3, 2006, available at
www.westlaw.com (World News); Mark Magnier & Alan Zarembo, China Admits Taking Executed
Prisoners’ Organs, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2006, available at http://www.latimes.com/la-fgorgans18nov18,0,4772205.story?coll=la-home-headlines (describing cases in which foreign patients spent
thousands of dollars to obtain transplants in China).
22
See, e.g., Letter to the Editor, Organ Harvesting in China Must End, NORTHCIFFE NEWSPAPERS
(Eng.), Sept. 7, 2006, at 20, available at 2006 WLNR 15554830 (contending China’s practice of procuring
organs must end because it violates the human rights of Chinese prisoners); Rothman et al., supra note 17
(asserting that organ procurement is “subject to gross abuse” because the practice is kept secret); Johnson,
supra note 19 (expressing concern that prisoners are not always respected during organ procurement);
Olympics Countdown, supra note 14 (discussing how China’s profit motive and record of corruption may
lead to abusive practices in organ procurement).
23
See Force the Dead to Donate Organs, BBC NEWS, Feb. 17, 1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/
health/281404.stm (Dr. John Harris, of the British Medical Association’s Ethics Committee, stated,
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Transplant organ supplies are limited due to low donation numbers and strict
national regulations.24 In countries such as the United States, Malaysia,
Australia, and the United Kingdom, patients often spend years on waiting
lists to receive vital organs.25 Consequently, patients who can afford to
purchase organs abroad travel to China to obtain transplant surgeries.26
Human rights critics assert China’s organ-procurement laws and
widespread use of the death penalty provide a consistent source of executed
prisoners for transplant purposes.27 Some Chinese transplant specialists
estimate that up to ninety-nine percent of the organs used for transplant
surgeries in China come from prisoner cadavers.28 Current Chinese media
reports claim China performs an average of 10,000 transplant surgeries
annually, out of approximately two million domestic requests for organs.29
“Thousand[s] of people in the UK, and tens of thousands world-wide, are dying because of the shortage of
organs”); Craig S. Smith, Doctor Says He Took Transplant Organs from Executed Prisoner, N. Y. TIMES,
June
29,
2001,
available
at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=
9F02EED81739F93AA15755C0A9679C8B63&sec=health&pagewanted=all; cf. Nancy Scheper-Hughes,
The New Cannibalism, NEW INTERNATIONALIST, Apr. 1998, available at http://sunsite.berkeley.edu/
biotech/organswatch/pages/cannibalism.html (arguing that modern cultures have developed an artificial
need for transplant organs); Julia Rommelfanger, Kidney for Cash: Organ Trafficking Poses New
Challenges, MEDSCAPE MEDICAL NEWS, Oct. 18, 2005.
24
See Foreigners Seeking Transplants Come to China for Organs of Executed Prisoners, LAOGAI
RESEARCH FOUND., Apr. 12, 2006, http://www.laogai.org/news/newsdetail.php?id=2528 (last visited
Feb. 7, 2007); Geoffrey Crothall, supra note 15; Craig S. Smith, Quandary in U.S. Over Use of Organs of
Chinese Inmates, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2001, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/
fullpage.html?sec=health&res (detailing how many foreign patients seek transplants from China due to the
lack of available organs in their home countries); Hearings, supra note 1, at 63; Rommelfanger, supra note
23 (testifying at the 12th Congress of the European Society for Organ Transplantation, Dr. Jose Fernando
Teixeira, president of the European Transplant Coordinators Organization, said patients turn to China for
organ transplants due to restricted donation in their home countries).
25
See Smith, supra note 24; BBC NEWS, Gaining Kidney From an Execution, June 28, 2001,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/1412467.stm (reporting that due to Malaysia’s sixteen-year
waiting list to obtain transplant organs, a Malaysian woman purchased a prisoner’s kidney in China).
26
See, e.g., McNeill & Coonan, supra note 17 (reporting that wealthy Japanese patients obtain organ
transplants in China); Julian Siddle, Global Demand Fuels Human Organ Trade, BBC NEWS, June 28,
2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/low/world/asia-pacific/1412348.stm (discussing Dr. Wang Guoqi’s
testimony that prisoner organs are sold to rich foreigners); Smith, supra note 23 (reporting that although
patients travel to countries such as India, Russia, and the Philippines to purchase transplants, China is
considered as one of the top suppliers of transplant organs); Deborah L. Shelton, Organ Trade in China
Raises Alarm Over Human Rights, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 24, 2006, at A1, available at 2006
WLNR 14481146 (detailing how foreign patients purchase transplant organs in China).
27
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA, supra note 2; 1984 Order, supra note 2 (authorizing organ
procurement from prisoner cadavers); Ella Lee, Bumper Organ Supply Before Lunar Festival, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Jan. 9, 2000, at 3, available at 2000 WLNR 3477087 (reporting that mass executions,
conducted during Chinese festivals, provide ‘adequate supplies’ of organs from executed prisoners); Craig
S. Smith, On Death Row, China's Source of Transplants, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2001, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B00E4D7143EF93BA25753C1A9679C8B63&sec=health
&spon=&pagewanted=all (reporting that executed prisoners are China’s main source of transplant organs).
28
Olympics Countdown, supra note 14.
29
Group Urges China to Detail Transplants, USA TODAY, Nov. 19, 2006
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2006-11-19-china-prisoners_x.htm?csp=34 (reporting that Deputy
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The actual figures are difficult to verify due to state secrecy surrounding the
practice.30 Additionally, medical and technological capabilities for organ
removal and transplant surgery continue to advance in China, making once
sophisticated procedures readily obtainable.31 In terms of supply, analysts
report that up to sixty-eight offenses are punishable by the death penalty in
China, and execution numbers soar during China’s periodical “Strike-Hard”
campaigns.32 Such programs enhance the penalty for many non-violent
crimes.33 There is an especially high death toll during the Chinese lunar
holiday when the Chinese government conducts mass executions.34 China’s
penal system ultimately increases the flow of prisoner cadavers to the
Chinese transplant network.35
The renewable source of prisoner organs provides the Chinese
government with a strong economic incentive to sell human organs to
foreign buyers.36 Due to the high global demand for transplant organs and
Prime Minister Huang Jiefu estimates that 10,000 transplants were conducted by the Chinese government
last year, out of nearly 1.5 million domestic requests for organs); China Bans Trade in Human Organs,
CHINA DAILY, July 16, 2006, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-07/16/
content_641780.htm.
30
See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 1, at 10 (asserting that real documentation of China’s organprocurement practice is impossible due to the Chinese government’s tendency to conceal its execution
practices and conduct criminal justice operations behind closed-doors). See also Mike Steketee, Diplomacy
Transplant, THE AUSTL., July 29, 2006, at 20, available at 2006 WLNR 13054451 (contending that
China’s lack of formal reporting must improve to end human rights abuses in organ-procurement);
Bryskine, supra note 20 (discussing how the lack of transparency in China’s organ-procurement practice
makes it difficult to document the practice).
31
See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 19 (reporting that China’s increasing medical sophistication
contributes to its organ-procurement program); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA, supra note 2 (discussing
how Chinese medical developments have facilitated organ procurement).
32
Calum MacLeod, China Makes Ultimate Punishment Mobile: Fatal Injections Administered from
Vehicles, USA TODAY, June 15, 2006, at 8A, available at 2006 WLNR 10282717. See also Baard &
Cooney, supra note 21; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA, supra note 2; Hearings, supra note 1, at 57; Peter
Nestor, When the Price is Too High: Rethinking China’s Deterrence Strategy for Robbery, PAC. RIM L. &
POL’Y J., Date, p 454-55 (discussing “Strike-Hard” campaigns and the death penalty in China); Stephen
Gregory, Harvesting Organs in China: the Preparation Sujiatun, EPOCH TIMES (P.R.C), 2005,
http://en.epochtimes.com/news/6-3-30/39868.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2007) (stating that seventy offenses
are punishable by death in China).
33
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA, supra note 2.
34
See Baard & Cooney, supra note 21; Lee, supra note 27; Dead Prisoners’ Organs for Sale, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 9, 2000, at 1, available at 2000 WLNR 3476902. See also Nestor supra, note
32, at 455 (citing Murray Scott Tanner, Campaign-Style Policing in China and Its Critics, in CRIME,
PUNISHMENT AND POLICING IN CHINA, 179 (Borge Bakken ed., 2005) (discussing how most executions
occur around Chinese holidays including New Year, Lunar New Year, May Day, Tiananmen Anniversary,
and the October National Holiday).
35
See Gregory, supra note 32; Foreigners Seeking Transplants Come to China for Organs of
Executed Prisoners, supra note 24 (asserting that China’s supply of transplant organ is due to its prolific
use of the death penalty).
36
See Organ Transplant Regulation Drafted, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE, Mar. 13, 2006,
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200603/13/eng20060313_250155.html (noting that the global shortage in
human organs presents the Chinese government with a lucrative market for human organs); Jill
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China’s large supply of prisoner cadavers, the Chinese government is ideally
poised to make lucrative gains from the sale of prisoner organs on the
international black market.37 Over the past ten years, China has become a
popular destination for foreigners in search of transplant organs.38 Foreign
patients pay as much as $200,000 for an organ transplant.39 International
doctors have reported numerous cases in which patients have traveled to
China to receive transplant organs from executed prisoners.40 Such reports
surfaced in the United States in 2001 when New York-based surgeon, Dr.
Thomas Diflo, consulted with several patients in need of post-operation care
after purchasing prisoner organs from the Chinese government.41 In 2001,
the Japanese Department of Health launched an investigation into the
Chinese organ-procurement practice after a number of Japanese patients
experienced life-threatening complications with kidney transplants obtained
in China.42 Although the Chinese government recently enacted the 2006
Provisions on the “Treatment of Cadavers” to prohibit the commercial use of
McGivering, ‘China Selling Prisoners’ Organs’, BBC NEWS, Apr. 19, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4921116.stm; Dead Prisoners’ Organs for Sale, supra 34; Erik Eckholm, Arrests
Put Focus on Human Organs from China, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1998, available at
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/china/index.html?offset=360.
37
See Christine Gorman et al., Body Parts for Sale, TIME MAGAZINE, Mar. 9, 1998, available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,987948,00.html?promoid=googlep (reporting that the
international demand for human organs provides the Chinese government with an economic incentive to
sell prisoner organs); Gregory, supra note 32 (discussing the “big business” of organ transplantation in
China); Ian Cobain and Adam Luck, The Beauty Products From the Skin of Executed Chinese Prisoners,
THE
GUARDIAN,
Sept.
13,
2005,
available
at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/china/story/
0,7369,1568622,00.html (indicating that China earns revenues by channeling organs from executed
prisoners into the cosmetic industry, which uses the skin from cadavers as an “aesthetic filler” in beauty
products); Don MacKay, Prisoners Killed for Organs, THE MIRROR (Eng.), Apr. 20, 2006, at 15, available
at 2006 WLNR 6594837 (calling China’s practice of selling prisoners’ organs “widespread and growing”).
38
See Erik Eckholm, supra 36 (reporting that patients from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore
travel to China to obtain transplant organs for a premium price due to organ shortages in their home
countries); Organ Trade Confirmed, DAILY TELEGRAPH (Sydney), Sept. 29, 2006, at 33, available at 2006
WLNR 16815206 (reporting that China’s booming organ trade is “targeted” at foreign patients); Oziewicz,
supra note 19. See also Jo Revill, UK Kidney Patients Head for China, OBSERVER INT’L (Eng.), Dec. 11,
2005, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/china/story/0,,1664750,00.html (reporting that British and
Australian patients are enticed by the prospect of obtaining organ transplants in China).
39
See Siddle, supra note 26 (reporting that foreigners pay more than $100,000 for the cost of travel
and obtaining an organ transplant in China); Mariana Wan & Simon Beck, Organs of Prisoners Used in
Ops, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 25, 1993, at 1, available at 1993 WLNR 2196543; Sally Guyoncourt,
Death Row Transplant Scandal, DAILY EXPRESS (Eng.), Sept. 28, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR
16789146 (reporting that a top Chinese surgeon offered to sell a liver to an undercover journalist for
£50,000); Rommelfanger, supra note 23; Shelton, supra note 26.
40
See Baard & Cooney, supra note 21. See also TAIPEI TIMES, China’s Death Penalty is Blamed for
Organ Trade, Jan. 10, 2001, available at http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2000/01/
10/18972 (Dr. Lo Chung-man, a Hong Kong transplant surgeon, said his team counsels patients against
transplants in China because they come from executed prisoners).
41
Baard & Cooney, supra note 21.
42
McNeill & Coonan, supra note 17.
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human organs, human rights analysts remain wary that China’s persistent
profit motive to sell prisoner cadavers will trump the government’s
adherence to its new ban.43
B.

Human Rights Groups Advocate for the Elimination of China’s
Procurement of Prisoner Organs Because It Results in Abuse

Human rights analysts express concern that China’s economic
incentive to sell transplant organs poses a conflict of interest between the
government’s profit motive and the treatment of prisoners.44 Transplant
interests dictate the time and course of execution procedures, often resulting
in the physical abuse of prisoners.45 Many Chinese doctors describe
incidents in which executions are purposely mishandled and prisoners are
kept alive during the organ-removal process to preserve the tissue for
transplantation.46 Human rights organizations additionally report that
executions are routinely tailored according to specific transplant needs.47
For example, prisoners are shot in the head for kidney removal, and shot in
43
MacLeod, supra note 32. See Provisions on the Administration of Entry and Exit of Cadavers
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., July 3, 2006, effective Aug. 1, 2006) available
at http://wwwhrw.org/reports/1994/china1/china_948.htm#N_100 [hereinafter 2006 Provisions]; Effort to
Regulate Organ Trade May Not Be Enough, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 16, 2006, at 14, available at
2006 WLNR 19850604 (asserting that China’s 2006 Provisions fail to address some of the biggest concerns
involved in organ-procurement); Shelton, supra note 26 (reporting that human rights groups are concerned
China’s 2006 regulation will not be fully applied due to government corruption and strong economic
motivation to continue selling prisoner organs).
44
See, e.g., McGivering, supra note 36 (Professor Steven Wigmore, chair of the Ethics Committee at
the British Transplantation Society, says its time for the medical profession to condemn China’s practice of
procuring organs from executed prisoners due to mounting evidence that these organs are used for
commercial purposes). See also Foreigners Seeking Transplants Come to China for Organs of Executed
Prisoners (human rights groups are worried that organs are obtained from Chinese prisoners without their
consent); Group Urges China to Detail Transplants, supra 29 (Health Ministry Spokesman Mao Qun’an
admitted that China’s use of prisoner organs for trade purposes lead to “improper” transplants); Magnier &
Zarembo, supra note 21 (Chinese Attorney Zhu Gongwei contends that the absence of proper organ
procurement regulation has led people to “cut corners for a quick profit”).
45
See Organs Are “Stolen” for Transplants, W. DAILY PRESS (Eng.), Apr. 20, 2006, at 10, available
at 2006 WLNR 6659346; Robert MacPherson, Britons Warned Over China’s Harvested Transplants,
AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Apr. 19, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 191350; Crackdown on Tourist Trade in
Body Parts, N. Z. HERALD, Nov. 18, 2006, at B11, available at 2006 WLNR 19968296 (alleging that
Chinese prisoners are “executed to order,” and that prisoners’ blood samples are matched with transplant
recipients prior to execution); Hearings, supra note 1, at 57-58 (describing how blood samples are taken
from prisoners prior to execution).
46
See Baard & Cooney, supra note 21 (Wei Jingsheng, Chinese human rights activist and former
political prisoner, testified that China’s organ-procurement procedures are routinely used as the means of
execution, asserting “no one cares if [the prisoners] are alive or dead”); Crothall, supra note 15; Smith,
supra note 24.
47
See Hearings, supra note 1, at 57 (describing how the Chinese government prioritizes organ
procurement over the human treatment of prisoners); Crothall, supra note 15 (detailing how transplant
needs direct the course of China’s organ-procurement practice).
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the chest for cornea operations.48 Prisoners are also given anti-coagulation
shots prior to execution to ease the organ-procurement surgery, and the date
and time of execution is scheduled based on the transplant recipient’s
request.49 An Australian newspaper recently revealed that the Chinese
government uses specially equipped “execution buses” to procure organs
from death-row prisoners.50 For these reasons, human rights groups and
medical organizations contend China’s zeal for utilizing prisoner organs for
commercial purposes compromises the humane treatment of death-row
prisoners.51
Due to the frequency of prisoner abuse, the Chinese
government’s strong economic interest in prisoner organs, and the lack of
transparency in Chinese execution procedures, human rights groups
condemn the organ-procurement practice and press for its abolition.52
HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS’ CURRENT LOBBYING EFFORT IS INEFFECTIVE
AT PERSUADING CHINA TO IMPLEMENT REFORMS

III.

Human rights groups’ present approach to promoting reforms in
China’s organ-procurement practice is unnecessarily overbroad and
misdirected at China’s adoption of international standards.53 Human rights
48

Baard & Cooney, supra note 21.
See, e.g., Id. (claiming that Chinese hospitals are tipped-off by judges as to when executions are
scheduled to occur); Scheper-Hughes, supra note 23 (reporting that a wealthy Chinese man was able to
quickly obtain a transplant organ from an executed prisoner); Hearings, supra note 1, at 57-58 (describing
how blood samples are taken from prisoners prior to execution).
50
Kim MacDonald, China Death Buses Linked to Organ Transplant Trade, W. AUSTL., Oct. 6,
2006, at 8, available at 2006 WLNR 17293057; MacLeod, supra note 32.
51
See Desperate Singaporeans Seek Kidney Transplant in China, supra note 21; Shelton, supra note
26; Foreigners Seeking Transplants Come to China for Organs of Executed Prisoners, supra note 24
(discussing China’s “soaring business” in conducting organ transplant surgeries on foreign patients); USA
TODAY, supra 29 (claiming China’s practice of removing prisoner organs is “profit-driven with little regard
for medical ethics”); Organs of Executed up for Sale, DAILY EXPRESS (Eng.), Apr. 20, 2006, available at
2006 WLNR 6598612.
52
See, e.g., China’s Regulation Banning Human Organ Trade Takes Effect, PEOPLE’S DAILY
ONLINE, July 2, 2006, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200607/02/eng20060702 (reporting that China’s
organ trade is severely criticized abroad); Rommelfanger, supra note 23 (discussing how international
doctors think the sale of transplant organs is unethical); Wan & Beck, supra note 39 (reporting that Dr.
Huang Chen-ya, a Chinese legislator, condemns China’s procurement of prisoner organs as a violation of
human rights); see also Rothman et al., supra note 17 (asserting that international medical and human
rights organizations oppose China’s sale of human organs); Crothall, supra note 15 (positing that the
presence of doctors at execution sites is unethical); Gregory, supra note 32 (asserting that organ
procurement is conducted in secrecy, and that the practice is unethical and inhumane).
53
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA, supra note 2 (criticizing multiple aspects of China’s organprocurement and death penalty systems, and endorsing international standards on human rights); Executed
According to What Law? - the Death Penalty in China, AMNESTY INT’L, AI Index ASA 17/003/2004, Mar.
22, 2004, http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engasa170032004 (condemning China’s organ-procurement
and death penalty practices, and recommending broad reforms in accordance with international human
rights dictates); Scheper-Hughes, supra note 23 (reporting that the World Medical Association condemns
49
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groups press China to eliminate organ procurement from prisoner cadavers,
and to reform other aspects of the Chinese penal system that facilitate this
practice.54 They also premise their reform efforts on China’s adoption of
international instruments and ethical standards.55 Human rights advocates
view these instruments as the gold-standard on humanitarian protection, but
such devices are unlikely to change China’s stance on organ procurement
because they lack legal resonance in the Chinese system.56
A.

International Standards Offer Weak Legal Support for Reform
Arguments

Human rights groups’ current effort to eliminate prisoner abuse in
China’s organ-procurement practice is ineffective because it focuses on
China’s adoption of international standards. Human rights lobbyists
advocate organ-procurement reforms by encouraging China to adopt the
collective ethical position expressed in international standards and
resolutions.57 These instruments provide an instructive framework for
China’s organ-procurement practice); Eckholm, supra note 36 (criticizing China’s financial incentive to
sell prisoners’ organs).
54
See, e.g., Steketee, supra note 30 (asserting that China’s use of prisoner cadavers in organ
procurement is an “abhorrent” violation of human rights, which continues in opposition to the international
position on organ transplantation); Shar Adams, Australian Surgeons Condemn “Horrific” Organ Trade,
EPOCH TIMES (P.R.C.), Apr. 30, 2006, http://en.epochtimes.com/news/6-4-30/41024.html (last visited Feb.
7, 2007) (discussing Australian doctors’ condemnations of China’s sale of prisoner organs); HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA, supra note 2 (discussing how China’s organ procurement program contravenes
international human rights principles); Olympics Countdown, supra note 14 (reporting that the death
penalty contributes to the organ procurement program, and condemning both of these practices as a
violation of human rights); Editorial, Harvest of Shame China Should Halt Sale of Organs from Executed
Prisoners, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Nov. 27, 2006, at A1, available at 2006 WLNR 20514461; Rothman et
al., supra note 17 (calling on China to stop organ procurement from executed prisoners); Eckholm, supra
note 38 (asserting that there is a strong connection between China’s death penalty and organ-procurement
programs).
55
See generally, Executed According to What Law? - the Death Penalty in China, supra note 53
(criticizing China’s failure to curb its use of the death penalty, and including the Chinese constitution in its
list of international instruments on human rights); Olympics Countdown, supra note 14 (asserting that
China’s organ procurement program violates international ethical standards).
56
Human rights organizations generally fail to support organ-procurement reforms with Chinese
law, see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA, supra note 2; Rothman et al., supra note 17; Hearings, supra note
1, at 9 (calling on China to end organ-procurement from prisoner cadavers because it violates international
human rights law and medical ethical standards.); Debra J. Saunders, Editorial, Global Bazaar in Body
Parts, S. F. CHRON., July 20, 2006, at B9, available at 2006 WLNR 12469628 (discussing Canadian human
rights efforts to combat China’s use and sale of prisoner organs, and concluding that “Western
democracies” must be pro-active in ending the practice).
57
Examples of international instruments currently endorsed by human rights groups include:
Resolution on Physician’s Conduct Concerning Human Organ Transplantation, THE WORLD MEDICAL
ASS’N, adopted by the Forty-Sixth World Medical Association’s General Assembly in Stockholm, Sweden,
Sept. 1994, available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/physicianconduct.html; WMA Resolution,
supra note 14; The United Nations’ Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners, G.A. Res. 45/111, ¶ 5,
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human rights protections, but they have no basis in Chinese law or policy.58
They fail to correspond to traditional Chinese viewpoints, and they risk
being seen as an affront to China’s fervently defended views on national
autonomy.59 Any benefit derived from the promotion of international
standards is more than off-set by the potential for such efforts to appear
culturally intrusive.60
B.

Promoting Broad Reforms Obscures the Fundamental Issue of Ending
Prisoner Abuse

Human rights groups’ present campaign to protect prisoners from
abuse is unfeasible because it advocates for sweeping reforms in multiple
areas of China’s criminal justice system. Some of the most vocal human
rights organizations contend that China’s organ-procurement practice, and
the death penalty scheme that fuels it, must be fully reformed in order to
adequately protect prisoners from abuse.61 It may be desirable, from a
human rights standpoint, to completely abolish both the death penalty and
the organ-procurement practices in China,62 but such reforms are
unrealistically overbroad, and ultimately unnecessary to end the procedural
and physical abuses that result from procurement procedures.63 Moreover,
framing organ-procurement abuses as resolvable only through the

U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/111 (Dec. 14, 1990), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/45/
a45r111.htm. See also Rothman et al., supra note 17; Olympics Countdown, supra note 14.
58
See Hearings, supra note 1, at 9-10 (asserting that China must conform to international human
rights standards); WMA Resolution, supra note 14; Olympics Countdown, supra note 14 (stating that
China’s organ-procurement practice violates international human rights standards, such as the charter for
the Olympic Games, which provides for “the preservation of human dignity”); Fundamental Principles of
Olympianism, The Olympic Charter, Sept. 1, 2004, at 9, available at http://www.olympic.org/uk/
organisation/missions/charter_uk.asp; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA, supra note 2 (directing
recommendations at China’s medical community, Chinese doctors are called upon to comply with the
U.N.’s “Principles of Medical Ethics Relevant to the Role of Health Personnel, Particularly Physicians, in
the Protection of Prisoners and Detainees Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment of Punishment”).
59
See Wu, supra note 20 (emphasizing China’s social and cultural acceptance of organ-procurement
from prisoner cadavers, Professor Chen Zhonghua asks the international community to assess the situation
from both perspectives, and to understand China’s social and ethical position).
60
See Hearings, supra note 1, at 9, 12 (testifying before the U.S. Congress, Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State Michael Parmly calls on China to comply with international standards).
61
Id. at 1, 13-14.
62
See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA, supra note 2 (discussing the close connection between
China’s organ-procurement program and China’s widespread use of the death penalty).
63
Id. See also Olympics Countdown, supra note 14; Cooney & Baard, supra note 21; Sherri
Williams, China’s Prisoner Abuse Unjust, Protestors Say, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Apr. 26, 2006, at 06a,
available at 2006 WLNR 17811697 (alleging that the Chinese government harvests organs from political
prisoners who are still alive).
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implementation of far-reaching reforms presents the Chinese government
with a weaker case for ending prisoner abuse.64
First, endorsing the complete cessation of China’s organ-procurement
practice is not the only means by which to ensure that prisoners are protected
from abuse. Human rights groups contend China’s practice of procuring
organs from executed prisoners must be eliminated because it constitutes an
inherent breach of human rights.65 Prisoner abuse is attributable, however,
to deficiencies in the text and application of China’s organ-procurement law,
rather than to the existence of the practice itself.66 Prisoner abuse is
eradicable through the enactment of tighter regulations and the inclusion of
controlling human rights protections.67 It is unnecessary to press for the
total abolition of organ procurement in prisons because modifying, rather
than eliminating, the practice can curb prisoner abuse.68 It is also unrealistic
to press for the total abolition of China’s organ-procurement practice
because the Chinese government depends on prisoner organs for nearly all
domestic transplant and research purposes.69 It is unreasonable to require
China to fully discontinue organ procurement from prisoner cadavers when
prisoner corpses would otherwise be cremated if not used for
transplantation.70
Second, as some analysts have stressed, pressing for the total abolition
of organ procurement in prisons risks driving China’s current participation in
the organ trade further underground.71 China has historically conducted
organ sales on the black market to avoid international scrutiny, and to benefit
from the absence of regulation.72 China’s long-held policy of maintaining
64
See Olympics Countdown, supra note 14 (asserting that China’s organ procurement program is an
adverse effect of the country’s death penalty system, and promoting reforms in both of these practices);
Stefania Bianchi, China: Prisoner Consent for Organ Harvest Flawed-Amnesty, INTER PRESS SERVICE
(Eng.), May 11, 2006, available at http://www.westlaw.com (World News).
65
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA, supra note 2; Gregory supra note 32 (arguing that organ
procurement denies prisoners the right to their own bodies).
66
See Vivian Wu, Transplant Guidelines Taking Shape: Document to Outline Ethical Principles for
Procurement, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 24, 2006, at 9, available at 2006 WLNR 18395399; Gregory,
supra note 32 (describing instances of prisoner abuse).
67
China’s existing organ-procurement regulations are habitually misapplied and ignore. See infra
Part IV.A.
68
See Wu, supra note 20 (quoting Professor Chen, who suggests that China’s organ-procurement
practice can be improved by strengthening regulations and enforcement measures).
69
Id. See also Shelton, supra note 26; Wu, supra note 66 (considering the high demand for
transplant organs, Chinese officials say the new regulations will not eliminate the sale of prisoners’ organs).
70
See 1984 Order, supra note 2 § 5 (providing that prisoner corpses be cremated).
71
Hewitt, supra note 15 (reporting that legislation aimed at restricting China’s organ trade could
lead to an increase in organ smuggling); Rothman et. al., supra note 17.
72
See John Augustyn, New Details of China’s Death Camp Emerge, EPOCH TIMES (P.R.C.), Mar.
17, 2006, available at http://en.epochtimes.com/news/6-3-17/39420.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2007); Baard
& Cooney, supra note 21.
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secrecy and using underground channels to profit from the sale of prisoner
organs demonstrate its tendency to shield its involvement in controversial
practices from international observation.73 Endorsing sweeping reforms is
problematic because it threatens to prompt the Chinese government to
further conceal its organ-procurement activities if such reforms are
perceived as unfeasible or intimidating.
Third, advocating for the elimination of the death penalty confuses the
issue of ending prisoner abuse and broadens the scope of reform efforts.
Human rights groups view prisoner abuse as a direct outgrowth of China’s
death penalty system, which provides executed cadavers into Chinese
transplant units.74
Although the death penalty enables the organprocurement practice by supplying corpses, it does not directly account for
the prisoner abuse that occurs during organ-procurement procedures.75
Instances of prisoner abuse, such as that witnessed by Dr. Guoqi, arise
during the preoperation and execution processes.76 The death penalty has no
bearing on how prisoners are treated during the course of organ-removal
procedures, and it has no effect on the efficacy or application of Chinese
organ-procurement law. 77
Using the prisoner abuse issue as a segue into the death-penalty
debate is also counterproductive to reform efforts because it has the
unwanted effect of expanding the scope of the organ-procurement problem
into more controversial areas of China’s penal system, and confusing the
elimination of prisoner abuse with the elimination of capital punishment.
Regardless of whether the Chinese government’s use of the death penalty
increases or declines over time, improving the treatment of death-row
prisoners can be accomplished without involving China’s death-penalty
practice.78 Pressing for the abolition of the death penalty to cure deficiencies

73

See Foreigners Seeking Transplants Come to China for Organs of Executed Prisoners, supra note
24 (demonstrating China’s tendency to shield its criminal justice practices from international observation);
Smith, supra note 27.
74
Hua, supra note 18; China’s Death Penalty is Blamed for Organ Trade, supra note 40 (posing as a
relative of a transplant patient, a reporter visited China’s Sun Yat-sen University of Medical Sciences
Hospital No.1 in Guangzhou. He was told that he could purchase a transplant organ, and that the best time
to obtain it was during the Chinese Lunar New Year when the most executions are performed). See Lerat,
supra note 16; Scheper-Hughes, supra note 23.
75
See Foreigners Seeking Transplants Come to China for Organs of Executed Prisoners, supra note
24.
76
See Part I (discussing Dr. Wang Guoqi’s testimony about instances in which prisoners were
physically abused during the organ removal process); Organs Are ‘Stolen’ for Transplants, supra note 45.
77
Cf. Olympics Countdown, supra note 14; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA, supra note 2.
78
Id.
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in China’s organ-procurement program is an ineffective strategy for
reform.79
IV.

CHINA’S CURRENT ORGAN-PROCUREMENT LAW LACKS CLEAR
PARAMETERS AND CONFLICTS WITH CHINESE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROSCRIPTIONS ON HUMAN RIGHTS

China’s seminal 1984 Order on the “Utilization of Prisoner Cadavers”
serves as the sole legal authority for organ procurement from executed
prisoners.80 Although the 1984 Order establishes basic guidelines,81 human
rights groups assert this law lacks the necessary regulations to safeguard
prisoners from abuse.82 In response to these concerns, China recently
enacted the 2006 Provisions on the “Entry and Exit of Cadavers,” which bar
the commercial use of human organs.83 Critics assert this law is unlikely to
curb China’s role in the organ trade because it gives the Chinese government
ultimate discretion over whether to approve cadaver exports and does
nothing to reduce China’s core economic interest in utilizing prisoner
cadavers for commerce.84 The 2006 Provisions do not address the issue of
organ procurement from prisoner cadavers.85 Consequently, the 1984 Order
is still controlling over China’s organ-procurement practice, and its attendant
faults remain unaltered.86 Viewed against the Chinese constitutional
requirement to protect and preserve human rights, China’s current organ-

79
See also Macartney, supra note 20 (estimating that China executes more people than the rest of the
world combined).
80
1984 Order, supra note 2 (authorizing the use of prisoner cadavers for transplant purposes).
81
Id. § 3 (providing that prisoner corpses can be used for procurement purposes when: (1) a permit
is issued to qualified doctors; (2) a city prefectorate arranges the utilization of corpses; and (3) an order is
issued to the “utilizing unit” to notify doctors of the availability of an executed cadaver after consent is
obtained; (4) an effort is made to keep organ-procurement secret; (5) a timely cremation occurs
postprocurement; and, (6) an exemption is granted for national minorities, which, in principle, cannot be
used for organ-procurement). See also Wu, supra note 20 (Chen Zhonghua, a Chinese professor, asserts
China’s organ-procurement practice must be subject to tighter regulations in order to protect prisoners from
abuse).
82
See Baard & Cooney, supra note 21 (condemning China’s organ-procurement practice as a “gross
violation of human rights,” Dr. Diflo detailed his experience with American patients, who received
transplant organs in China); Wan & Beck, supra note 39; McGivering, supra note 36; Organs Are ‘Stolen’
for Transplants, supra note 45.
83
2006 Provisions, supra note 43.
84
Id.
85
See infra Part IV.A.
86
China promulgated the 2006 Provisions to strengthen organ transplant requirements, but this law
does not address the use of prisoners’ organs, nor establish rules for organ-removal procedures. See infra
Part IV.B. See also China to Tighten Rules on Organ Transplants, AUSTL. BROAD. CORP., Nov. 28, 2006,
available at 2006 WLNR 20564134 (reporting that China will tighten regulations on its organ-procurement
practice).
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procurement scheme is inconsistent.87 The Chinese government’s on-going
failure to address the issue of prisoner abuse and reform its organprocurement practice constitutes a breach of Chinese constitutional law.88
A.

The 1984 Order Authorizes the Use of Prisoner Cadavers for Organ
Procurement but Lacks the Necessary Regulation to Protect Prisoners
from Abuse

China’s 1984 Order was intended to introduce the practice of
extracting organs from prisoner cadavers, and to establish basic parameters
for organ procurement.89 It outlines requirements on prisoner consent and
medical supervision, but it fails to include specific regulation on how far the
organ-procurement practice can encroach upon China’s standard execution
process.90 The 1984 Order also leaves much room for interpretation about
how to apply its terms, and how to regulate the actual procurement
procedure.91 Due to these key omissions, the 1984 Order opens the door to
procedural and physical abuse, resulting in the improper treatment of
prisoners.92
The government issued the 1984 Order “to support the advancement
of medical research and to help change social customs.”93 It was designed to
provide “temporary rules” on organ procurement from executed prisoners,
and to gauge political repercussions.94 China originally endeavored to keep
the existence of the 1984 Order confidential to avoid international scrutiny.95
Until recently, China categorically denied that it procured organs from
prisoner cadavers.96 Chinese government spokespeople now admit that
87
XIAN FA art. 33, § 3 (1982) (P.R.C.) [Constitution] (full text is available online at the National
People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China), available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/english/
constitution/constToDetail.jsp?id=full&pages=3#Chapter2.
88
See infra Part IV.C.
89
1984 Order, supra note 2.
90
Id. §§ 1, 3.
91
Wan & Beck, supra note 39.
92
See Hearings, supra note 1, at 57.
93
1984 Order, supra note 2.
94
Id.
95
Wan & Beck, supra note 39.
96
S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 29, 2001, at 9, available at 2001 WLNR 3730332 (reporting that
Chinese government spokesman Zhang Qiyue refuted claims that China harvests organs from executed
prisoners, denouncing the allegations as “vicious slander” and “sensational lies,” and maintaining that
China’s primary source of organs is public donation). See also Beijing’s Empty Words-Chinese
Government Responds to Accusations, LAOGAI RESEARCH FOUND., Oct. 16, 1998, http://www.laogai.org/
news/newsdetail.php?id=1988 (last visited Feb. 7, 2007) (speaking on the condition of anonymity, a
Chinese government official admitted that China uses prisoner organs, but only when consent is obtained);
see Organ Trade Confirmed, supra note 38 (reporting that Chinese officials rebuke allegations of forcibly
taking organs from executed prisoners).
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organs are procured from prisoner cadavers, and sometimes sold to foreign
buyers.97 Nonetheless, China insists such practices are used only “in a very
few cases.”98 Although the 1984 Order was never officially passed through
the National People’s Congress, nor given more than “temporary” legal
status, China has neither replaced nor modified its general provisions.99 In
the absence of subsequent legislation, the 1984 Order continues to function
as the governing authority on China’s practice of procuring organs from
executed prisoners.100
The 1984 Order provides cursory guidelines on organ procurement,
but fails to adequately clarify or restrict extraction procedures. It authorizes
organ procurement from prisoner cadavers, focusing on three main areas of
regulation.101 First, the 1984 Order requires consent to be obtained from the
prisoner or his family prior to execution.102 Second, the 1984 Order
stipulates that organ procurement can only be performed after death is
confirmed by a supervising official.103 Executions are required to conform
to the relevant requirements in Chinese criminal law for “death to be carriedout by means of shooting.”104 Finally, the 1984 Order mandates that
prisoner organ procurement be kept strictly secret to avoid negative political
consequences.105 Medical workers are forbidden from wearing hospital
insignia or driving marked vehicles to or from execution sites.106 These
provisions offer general parameters on organ removal, but lack specificity on
how to conduct the procurement procedure in accordance with the standard
execution protocol.107
97

Macartney, supra 20 (reporting that the Chinese government admits that organs from executed
prisoners are sold to foreign buyers).
98
See McGivering, supra note 36.
99
2006 Provisions, supra note 43 (omitting provisions on organ-procurement and treatment of
prisoners).
100
See Macartney, supra note 20. See also Wu, supra note 66 (reporting that the Chinese government
is currently drafting the first ethical regulations for organ-procurement); Foreigners Seeking Transplants
Come To China for Organs of Executed Prisoners, supra note 24 (reporting that “permanent” regulations
for organ-procurement are currently underway).
101
Cf. 1984 Order, supra note 2, with Gregory, supra note 32 (stating that the 1984 Order is unethical
because it “involves collusion between security agencies and medical officials”).
102
1984 Order, supra note 2, §§ 3, 4.
103
Id. § 1 (requiring death to be confirmed by a “supervising procuratorial official” at the execution
site).
104
Id.
105
Id. § 4; see Wan & Beck, supra note 39.
106
1984 Order, supra note 2, § 4-4.
107
Id. § 4, 1-3 (focusing on the bureaucratic aspects of organ-procurement, detailing procedures for
obtaining permits and authorization, but leaving blank the question of how to conduct actual organprocurement procedures and preoperation treatment of death-row prisoners). See also Wu, supra note 66
(reporting that the 2006 Provisions fail to address key issues, including the source of organs, the
administration of the procurement process, and the definition of death).
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The absence of adequate regulation in China’s 1984 Order produces
repeated instances of procedural and physical abuse.108 The extent of the
1984 Order’s human rights protections is limited to requirements on prior
consent and post-mortem extraction.109 It lacks rules on how to conduct the
actual procurement process, thereby failing to protect prisoners from the
physical and procedural abuse that occur during organ removal.110 It also
fails to indicate how death is determined.111 Moreover, China’s 1984 Order
provides no direction on how organ procurement should square with
standard execution guidelines.112
Due to the lack of straightforward regulations, the 1984 Order is also
frequently misapplied.113 Reports from Chinese doctors demonstrate that
some of the most extreme cases of prisoner abuse occur in violation of the
1984 Order’s existing textual requirements.114 Instances in which organs are
extracted from live prisoners and executions are intentionally botched
clearly contravene the 1984 Order’s stipulation that organ removal begin
only after death is declared and conducted.115 These cases of abuse speak to
a problem of misapplication rather than textual deficiency, and they
underscore how the lack of specific regulations on how to define and
determine death opens the door to instances of live extraction.116
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The 2006 Provisions Ban the Commercial Use of Organs, but Fail to
Modify China’s Current Organ-Procurement Scheme

China enacted the 2006 “Provisions on the Entry and Exit of Cadavers
and Treatment of Cadavers” to regulate the transport of human corpses.117
Although the 2006 Provisions prohibit trading in human organs, this law
does not address the operation of China’s organ-procurement practice.118 On
its own terms, critics assert the 2006 Provisions are unlikely to end China’s
participation in the organ trade because they leave the ultimate discretion on
all export matters to the Chinese government.119 More importantly,
compared to the 1984 Order, the 2006 Provisions make no significant
modifications to China’s organ-procurement law, entirely omitting reference
to the use of prisoner cadavers.120 The 2006 Provisions fail to effect formal
organ-procurement reform, and they fail to alter the 1984 Order’s regulatory
scheme.
The 2006 Provisions were intended to assuage international fears
about China’s role in the global organ trade.121 They were issued as a set of
“strict rules” meant to quell “fierce overseas criticism” and for the purpose
of “protecting public interests, maintaining public ethics, and preventing
infectious diseases from spreading.”122 Although the Chinese government
has characterized the 2006 Provisions as a reform measure, this law
primarily functions as a customs regulation on the transport and quarantine
of human cadavers.123 It was drafted to restrict the postprocurement
transport of human organs and thus does not affect how organ-procurement
procedures are regulated or conducted.124
The 2006 Provisions’ most significant feature is a ban on trading in
human organs. Under Article 8, “It is strictly prohibited to trade in cadavers,
and to make use of cadavers to engage in commercial activities.”125 The
117
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term “cadaver” is defined in Article 2 as “dead human bodies and the
specimens thereof,” including human organs, bones, and tissue.126 Although
Article 8 seemingly provides an absolute bar to China’s commercial use of
human organs, human rights groups assert that the efficacy of this law is
jeopardized by its certification process, which gives the Chinese government
full discretion to approve the transport of corpses.127 Under Article 7, if
customs officials are presented with a valid certificate, the cadaver is
released.128 The 2006 Provisions give no indication, however, about what is
involved in issuing a certificate, or what, if any, standards are applicable.129
Although shipment certificates must be ratified by Chinese agencies, the
2006 Provisions provide no criteria for granting certificates and require no
documentation of the cadaver’s place of origin.130
This malleable
certification system, combined with the Chinese government’s strong
economic incentive to profit from the sale of human organs, indicates that
the 2006 Provisions will not be effective at eliminating China’s use of
human cadavers for commercial purposes.131
Compared to the 1984 Order, the 2006 Provisions do not adequately
modify China’s organ-procurement regulations. They fail to include
restrictions on the use of prisoner cadavers, and they impose no
requirements on the actual organ-procurement practice.132 The 2006
Provisions ultimately provide no guidance on how to resolve the conflict
between meeting transplant needs and providing for the humane treatment of
prisoners.133 Whereas the 1984 Order regulates the preprocurement
conditions, such as consent, authorization, and notification of execution, the
2006 Provisions govern the postprocurement utilization of organs and
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cadavers.134 Neither of these regulations establishes guidelines on how
actual procurement and preoperation treatment should be conducted.135 This
void in legal depth and clarity has not only roused reproach from human
rights groups, but has also prompted some Chinese legislators to voice
concerns about the practice.136
C.

China’s Organ-Procurement Laws Conflict with Chinese
Constitutional Requirements to Protect Human Rights

China’s organ-procurement laws conflict with Chinese constitutional
proscriptions on human rights because they allow for prisoner abuse.137
Viewed against Article 33, Section 3, China’s current organ-procurement
laws lack sufficient regulations to protect prisoners from abuse.138 The 1984
Order establishes few limitations on how to conduct organ procurement, and
it supplies no safeguards to ensure that prisoners are treated in accordance
with the government’s obligation to protect and preserve human rights.139
Article 33, Section 3, requires the state to procure organs in conformity with
human rights requirements and to fully incorporate these rules in its organprocurement scheme.140 China’s organ-procurement practice violates these
proscriptions by allowing for prisoner abuse, creating an enduring conflict
between the Chinese constitution and organ procurement in China.
D.

China’s Organ-Procurement Laws Fail to Pass Muster Under the
Chinese Constitution Because They Allow for Prisoner Abuse

China’s twenty-year failure to reform organ-procurement rules and
implement human rights standards represents an ongoing violation of
Chinese constitutional requirements.141 The Chinese constitution was
134
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intended to establish uniform national standards and provide binding legal
authority over all national laws.142 The constitution’s preamble explicitly
requires its full implementation into Chinese law to “reunify” the
motherland under socialist policy.143 China originally ratified its constitution
on December 4, 1982, adding amendments in 1988, 1993, 1999, and 2004.144
These amendments primarily impose economic restrictions, but the 2004
regulation includes an important provision on the protection of human
rights.145 China views its constitutional requirements as “entrenched,”
serving as “the highest and fundamental law” of the land.146 Chinese
governmental literature confirms that the constitution is binding on all
domestic law and drafted to strike regulations that conflict with its
requirements.147 Any legal provision that conflicts with the Chinese
constitution is void.148
V.

THE CHINESE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES STRONG LEGAL AUTHORITY
FOR PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS REFORMS

The Chinese constitution is imbued with the requisite wording and
legal authority to lend support to reforms in China’s organ-procurement
practice. It functions as the supreme law of the land and requires the
implementation of its proscriptions in all areas of domestic law.149 In
comparison to international standards, the Chinese constitution serves as an
effective tool by which to end prisoner abuse because it provides the
Chinese government with a domestic source of human rights standards. Due
to its familiarity in the Chinese system and its command over Chinese law,
China’s constitution provides a sound legal basis and a strong source of
support for efforts to eliminate prisoner abuse in organ procurement.
A.

China’s Constitution Is an Effective Legal Tool to End Prisoner Abuse
in Organ Procurement

As the supreme law of the land, the Chinese constitution provides
strong legal support for reform arguments because it contains binding legal
142
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authority and the capacity to strike laws that conflict with its
requirements.150 Nowhere in the Chinese constitution does it indicate that
prisoners are exempt from human rights protections.151 Whereas Article 34
expressly provides that electoral rights are available to all Chinese citizens,
“except persons deprived of political rights according to law,” Article 33,
Section 3, makes no such exception to its requirement that human rights be
preserved.152 This section’s broad mandate on the protection of human
rights is applicable to cure deficiencies in the 1984 Order by requiring China
to bring existing organ-procurement regulations within the ambit of Chinese
constitutional proscriptions.153 For the 1984 Order to pass constitutional
muster, it must be enacted into formal law and modified from its present
form to include comprehensive regulation of organ procurement. It must
explicitly prohibit live extractions and establish how organ procurement is
meant to accord with execution procedures. The Chinese constitution
provides a viable basis for promoting reforms because it is binding authority
over organ-procurement law and requires the Chinese government to adhere
to its mandate on the protection of human rights.
The Chinese constitution provides a stronger foundation for reform
arguments than international instruments. The Chinese constitution lends
greater legal support to reform efforts because it is a product of domestic
Chinese law and policy.154 Whereas international standards lack resonance
in the Chinese system, the Chinese constitution has important value as a
binding and accepted legal standard.155 The Chinese constitution is
embedded in the Chinese legal system and is designed to be fully
implemented in Chinese law.156 Though comprised of some international
language and terminology, it possesses more legal authority and commands
greater government adherence than international human rights instruments.
Due to the China’s firm stance against the imposition of foreign values,
reform arguments grounded in Chinese constitutional principles are more
likely to draw support from the Chinese government.
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Chinese Constitutional Human Rights Requirements Are Applicable to
Cure Defects in China’s Organ-Procurement Law

The Chinese constitution provides strong support for lobbying efforts
because it broadly promotes the protection of human rights and requires that
these guidelines be implemented in all areas of Chinese law.157 The
implementation of Article 33, Section 3 is required by Chinese law and
encouraged by the Chinese government’s current effort to square
constitutional mandates with conflicting national regulations.158 Although
China’s constitution does not function as a penal instrument and cannot be
used to seek redress for grievances against the government, it is capable of
directly striking regulations that conflict with its tenets.159
Chinese constitutional laws are designed to be fully implemented and
enforced, and recent trends demonstrate China’s effort to incorporate these
standards into its national legal scheme.160 In June 2001, the Chinese
government appointed a standing committee to examine domestic laws
contrary to Chinese constitutional requirements and weed out provisions of
Chinese law that fail to accord with constitutional strictures.161 Additionally,
China’s legal system is evolving, and the Chinese government seeks to
improve and develop organ-procurement laws.162 The introduction of the
Chinese constitution and the recent 2004 amendment on human rights
demonstrate that China is willing to enact progressive legal reforms.163
Using the Chinese constitution to support reform efforts is a persuasive
lobbying tactic because it presents the Chinese government with compelling
legal support for modifying organ-procurement law.
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HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS MUST NARROW THE FOCUS OF REFORM
EFFORTS AND ENDORSE THE CHINESE CONSTITUTION TO ELIMINATE
PRISONER ABUSE

Human rights groups must change their current strategy to accomplish
reforms in China’s organ-procurement practice. The Chinese constitution
requires domestic laws to conform to its prescriptions, and the Chinese
government must modify its existing body of organ-procurement laws in
order to meet these requirements. Although it remains an uphill battle to
convince the Chinese government to implement the necessary safeguards for
death-row prisoners, the Chinese government is less likely to reject reform
efforts that draw from Chinese constitutional law than from international
ethical standards. Human rights groups must narrow the focus of their
criticisms and promote Chinese constitutional human rights protections to
make a more compelling argument for reform.
A.

China’s Organ-Procurement Laws Must Be Modified to End Prisoner
Abuse by Conforming to Chinese Constitutional Requirements

China must enact new provisions that expressly forbid prisoner abuse
by establishing clear parameters for organ removal. These regulations
should reiterate “after death’ requirements, specifically barring the use of
live extractions under any circumstance. New regulations also must specify
how organ-procurement laws are meant to accord with execution procedure,
mandating that organ-procurement surgeries follow the predetermined
execution schedule rather than allowing schedules to be set in accordance
with last-minute transplant needs. Prisoners must be adequately notified of
the date and time of execution, and executions must not be conducted prior
to the original date. Provisions also must stipulate that the prisoner is
informed of the purpose of anticoagulation shots and other medical
treatment performed to facilitate organ removal.
B.

Modification of China’s Organ-Procurement Laws Must Include
Enforcement Measures to Ensure the Efficacy of Legal Reforms

Due to the significant gaps in human rights protections in the current
procurement law and lack of permanence in the controlling 1984 Order,
reforms are needed to provide more comprehensive regulation of organ
procurement and to eliminate areas of abuse. New regulation must include
an oversight system and provide requirements on monitoring the
procurement of prisoner organs. Human rights groups have suggested that
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China keep records of all transplant procedures, including the time and date
of procurement, the type of organ procured, and the name of the prisoner
involved.164 To add another layer of protection, new procurement rules must
include penal measures for officials who fail to conduct procurement
according to established law.
C.

Reform Efforts Must Focus on Eliminating the Most Serious Instances
of Abuse Rather Than Promoting Broad-Based Reforms

Human rights groups must prioritize the elimination of prisoner abuse
itself, instead of calling for the widespread reform of the China’s criminal
justice practices. It may be preferable to eliminate the organ-procurement
and death-penalty practices as the means to achieve reforms, but these
measures are an unnecessary and unrealistic way to end prisoner abuse.
From a tactical standpoint, human rights groups must narrow the scope of
their criticisms because the problem of prisoner abuse can be solved without
questioning the legitimacy of the organ procurement and death penalty
practices. Additionally, eliminating the discussion of these practices enables
the Chinese government to review the core problem of prisoner abuse
without being encumbered by the controversial and confusing aspects of
adjunct reform issues. Tailoring the scope of reforms to the specific
elimination of prisoner abuse avoids confusing the issue with other areas of
Chinese criminal-justice operations, and is more likely to appeal to the
Chinese government.
D.

Human Rights Groups Must Endorse the Chinese Constitution Rather
Than International Instruments to Promote the End of Prisoner Abuse

Human rights groups must promote China’s constitutional protections
to strengthen the legal basis behind their reform efforts. The Chinese
constitution includes the requisite human rights language and principles to
eradicate prisoner abuses in the organ-procurement practice. As the supreme
law of China, the constitution provides the legal authority necessary to
support and promote reform efforts. In comparison with international
standards and instruments, Chinese constitutional requirements on human
rights are already embedded in the country’s legal tradition and respected by
the Chinese government. It is unnecessary for human rights groups to
promote reforms by endorsing international standards when the Chinese
constitution already provides such a framework. Chinese constitutional
164
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principles on human rights provide the necessary text and wording to lend
legal support to organ-procurement reforms. Moreover, because the Chinese
constitution is imbued with binding authority and integrally rooted in the
Chinese legal system, it provides a compelling basis for advancing human
rights reforms in the organ-procurement practice. Instead of pressuring
China to conform to international standards, human rights groups must
endorse the implementation of Chinese constitutional requirements on
human rights to make a more persuasive case for eliminating prisoner abuse.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Chinese constitution must be endorsed to lend legal support to
reform efforts and to encourage the Chinese government to modify its organprocurement law in accordance with Chinese constitutional human rights
standards. Human rights groups must restructure reform arguments in such
a way as to draw maximum support from the Chinese government, rather
than press for grand-scale legal modifications that risk appearing culturally
intrusive and substantively overbroad. The Chinese constitution provides an
effective means of eliminating prisoner abuse in organ procurement because
its text can be directly applied to forbid the mistreatment of prisoners. To
make a stronger case for the elimination of prisoner abuse, human rights
groups must narrow the focus of reform efforts and promote the application
of Chinese constitutional protections to cure human rights deficiencies in
China’s organ-procurement practice.

